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Abstract
We propose a new method to assess sovereign risk in Eurozone countries using an approach that relies
on consistent tests for stochastic dominance e¢ ciency. The test statistics and the estimators are computed
using mixed integer programming methods. Our analysis is based on macroeconomic fundamentals and
their importance in accounting for sovereign risk. The results suggest that net international investment
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1 Introduction
The widening and uctuating behavior of sovereign risk premium di¤erentials in the Eurozone, since the
onset of the 2008-2010 nancial crises, which jeopardized the creditworthiness of several Euro area countries,
led a number of authors to question the determinants of sovereign di¤erentials in the context of a monetary
union and whether yield spreads are a good measure of sovereign risk default.1
At the same time, the recent crises showed the inadequacy of existing early warning signal (EWS) models
that failed to ring alarm bells before the outburst of the crises.2
Understanding what has prompted recent changes in sovereign risk is particularly relevant for policymak-
ers. Motivated by the current Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, our paper o¤ers a further contribution to the
existing literature on the determinants of sovereign risk and proposes a method to assess sovereign risk in
the Eurozone. It is based on macroeconomic variables and employs a methodology that relies on consistent
tests for stochastic dominance (SD hereafter) e¢ ciency.
Most literature in the context of a monetary union has been dissecting a systemic risk factor, associated
with shifts in international appetite, or the e¤ects of common macroeconomic shocks on economic funda-
mentals(Ang and Longsta¤, 2013, p. 493), and has discarded country-specic determinants (Eichengreen
and Mody, 2000; Baek et al., 2005; Reinhart and Rogo¤, 2009; Dieckmann and Planck, 2012). Spillovers
e¤ects and contagion (see e.g.,Kaminsky et al., 2003, Bekaert et al., 2011; Longsta¤ et al. 2011) have also
been studied to analyze the common shock mechanism that is not related to country-specic fundamentals.
However, other studies analyzing the recent nancial crises led to controversial results. Barrios et al. (2009),
looking at weekly data and using CDS spreads, nd that the impact of domestic factors on yield spreads
increased signicantly during the crisis. They also suggest that because of the changes in public nances and
the expected higher risk awareness of investors after the crisis, yield spreads raised at a higher level than
in the pre-crisis period. Ang and Longsta¤ (2013) study the exposure of sovereigns to systemic and idio-
syncratic shocks, comparing US states and countries inside the EU. They nd that Greece had about three
times the systemic risk of other vulnerable sovereigns, such as Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Belgium,
which, in turn had roughly twice as much systemic risk as the remaining sovereigns in the EMU. Manasse
and Zavalloni (2013) study CDS spreads inside the EU and explore possible regional contagion within the
Eurozone. Their evidence supports the conclusion that country-specic fundamentals and structural fragili-
ties matter for sovereign risk. Finally, Beirne and Fratzscher (2013), Beetsma et al. (2013), Kalotychou et al.
(2013), and De Grauwe and Ji (2014) stress a role for sovereigns macroeconomic fundamentals and regional
contagion during the European sovereign debt crisis.
Concerns about scal sustainability are signicant for countries like Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal
and Spain (see e.g., Gibson et al., 2012). At the same time, the use of public balance sheets to shore up
1The credit and banking crises, which anticipated the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, culminated with the demise of
Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Since then, doubts about the creditworthiness of individual European countries
emerged. Fitch downgraded Ireland and Greece in Nov-Dec. 2009, but the apex was reached on 28 April 2010, when
the intra-day interest rate for 2-year Greek government bond peaked at 38%. After a series of downgradings and
bailouts of Greece (Spring 2010), Ireland (Fall 2010), and Portugal (Spring 2011), the instability increased and both
Italy and Spain were downgraded after summer 2011. Instability a¤ected other EU countries, including Germany
and France, and EU banks that held large porfolios of Eurozone sovereign debt. The Securities Markets Program was
instituted by the ECB in May 2010. While initially only Greek debt was eligible, in summer 2010 the ECB started
buying Irish and Portuguese debt and later Spanish and Italian. The overall size of the program reached $218 billion
in Dec. 2012.
2Among others, Davis and Karim (2008) applying macro EWS models, logit and binary recursive tree methodolo-
gies, found that for the US and UK these models failed to predict a crisis in 2007.
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national nancial systems has also created a link between nancial sector and public sector bailouts (see
e.g., Sgherri and Zoli, 2009). In particular, each country has shown its own mix and strict interconnection
between external, scal and nancial imbalances, depending on specic circumstances (see e.g., Gibson et
al., 2014; Honkapohja, 2014). Thus, there is a need of developing a measure to assess higher default risk
for governments pursuing unsound scal policies, or economies exposed to weakness in the external trade
sector. It would be also called for to make sure that the institutional system can address potential sources
of instability in these dimensions.
In this paper we propose a construction of an aggregate index of sovereign risk in the Eurozone based
on macroeconomic variables. Our focus on sovereigns macroeconomic variables is grounded on previous
studies that rely on macro indicators as explanatory variables of a country vulnerability and/or contagion
or spill-over e¤ects from other countries. The methodology we employ is based on SD e¢ ciency tests on
multi-variate (multidimensional) comparisons of country panel data over various years. This methodology
is new in the analysis of sovereign risk in the Eurozone, and leads to very promising results. It allows us to
overcome a serious shortcoming of most empirical literature that performs a separate analysis of single-risk
factors and thus ignores the association among the various determinants of sovereign risk3 . It also seems to
perform better than recent research developing a composite index with weights for indicators based on gaps
from a long-term trend (see e.g., Borio and Drehmann, 2009), where the predictive ability drops considerably
over short-term horizons.
SD e¢ ciency tests are applied in Pinar et al. (2013) to construct an optimal human development index.
A similar approach is also employed in Agliardi et al. (2012), where an optimal country risk index is
constructed following SD analysis with di¤erential component weights for emerging countries. Here we use
the macroeconomic variables that are appropriate for the Eurozone and develop the worst-case scenario index
for the Eurozone countries.
The intuition behind our method is that it provides an e¢ cient index resulting from the least variable
combination of risk factors that o¤ers the maximum level of risk over time for each country or group of
countries. Here relatively large data sets are available, so nonparametric analysis can let the data speak
for themselves. The optimality of the index refers to the fact that the weights given to each risk factors
will make it stochastically dominate all other competitor indices, thus o¤ering the maximum level of risk in
Euro area countries for a given probability level and also the least volatile index over time among its set
of competitors. In other words, rather than pair-wise SD comparisons of risk factors (see e.g., Barrett and
Donald, 2003; Linton et al., 2005), we follow the Scaillet and Topaloglou (2010) SD e¢ ciency methodology
that allows for full diversication of weights to combine risk factors, which gives the maximum risk level for
the Eurozone area. A further advantage is that by weighting each risk factor di¤erently, we obtain optimal
weights for the riskiest variables, which adds both theoretical and practical motivation to our index. It
allows us to detect possible changes of the weights (i.e., change in riskiest combinations of factors) over time
and/or for di¤erent groups of countries, in comparison to the arbitrarily weighted risk measures o¤ered, for
example, by rating institutions.
In summary, the main contribution of this paper is to derive an optimal sovereign risk index based on
SD e¢ ciency analysis. Additionally, our paper contributes to the current debates on the reliability of the
rating assignment to countries by the rating agencies, the crises predictions by EWS models, and on the
3A broad empirical literature, based on regression analysis, studies debt crises as dependent variables, where,
typically, a set of solvency indicators (such as the ratio of debt to GDP, GDP growth, the real exchange rate,
liquidity indicators, the level of international reserves) are considered as independent variables. Other institutional
and political variables, debt history, nancing needs indicators and macroeconomic volatility may also be included
(see e.g., Panizza et al., 2009).
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e¤ectiveness of CDS spreads as good measures of sovereign risk default.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 denes the main notation for SD. Section 3 presents
the variables used for the analysis and their descriptive statistics. The main results are given in Section
4 where we provide overall and sub-group (scal and external trade) risk indices and rank the Eurozone
countries for each respective risk index.
2 Model Set-up
In this section we present the test statistic for the SD e¢ ciency of the sovereign risk index constructed from
macroeconomic variables. Let fY t; t 2 Zg denote a stochastic process with values in Rn. The observations
consist in a realization of fY t; t = 1; :::; Tg, and n represents the di¤erent constituent components, i.e.
macroeconomic variables, where T is the total number of observations consisting of panel data set of countries,
over a given period of time. We denote by F (y), the continuous cdf of Y = (Y1; :::; Yn)0 at point y =
(y1; :::; yn)
0. Let us take a composite index with equal weights (i.e.,  0Y ) as a benchmark ( is the weighting
vector of 1n
0
s) to test the argument whether the equally-weighted index is SD e¢ cient or a di¤erent set
of weights would allocate relatively riskier macroeconomic environment. Consider an alternative weighting
scheme  2 L , where L := f 2 Rn+ : e0 = 1g with e for a vector made of ones and denote by G(z;;F )
the cdf of the alternative composite index 0Y at point z given by G(z;;F ) :=
Z
Rn
If0u  zgdF (u) where
I denotes the indicator function I(0u  z) and z is a given risk level.
Dene for z 2 R:
J1(z;;F ) := G(z;;F );
J2(z;;F ) :=
Z z
 1
G(u;;F )du =
Z z
 1
J1(u;;F )du;
and so on. The empirical counterpart is obtained by integrating with respect to the empirical distribution
F^ of F , that is, for the SD order of j  2:
Jj(z;; F^ ) = 1
T
TX
t=1
1
(j   1)! (z   
0Y t)
j 1
+ :
The hypotheses for testing whether the equally-weighted risk index,  0Y , is relatively the worst-case
scenario (i.e., the riskiest combination of the factors) is as follows:
Hj0 : Jj(z;  ; F^ )  Jj(z;; F^ )for all z 2 R and for all 2 L;
Hj1 :Jj(z;  ; F^ ) > Jj(z;; F^ )for some z 2 R or for some 2 L:
Under the null hypothesisHj0 , there is no composite risk index 
0Y constructed from the set of risk factors
that dominates the benchmark equally-weighted risk index  0Y at SD order of j. In this case, Jj(z;  ;F ) is
always lower than Jj(z;;F ) for all possible risk indices constructed with any possible weighting scheme, ,
at any risk level z. Under the alternative hypothesis Hj1 , an alternative risk index 
0Y exists, such that for
some risk level z, Jj(z;  ;F ) is larger than Jj(z;;F ). Thus, when j = 1; the risk index that is obtained
with equal weights,  0Y , is stochastically not the riskiest case at the rst-order, if and only if some other
index with an alternative weighting scheme, 0Y , dominates it at some risk level z. Put in another way, the
benchmark risk index  0Y is stochastically the worst-case scenario at the rst-order, if and only if there is
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no alternative risk index 0Y that dominates it at all levels of risk. SD e¢ ciency tests can be specied at
rst- and second-order when j = 1 and j = 2, respectively (SD1 and SD2, hereafter).
In particular, we consider the weighted Kolmogorov-Smirnov type test statistic for testing whether the
equally-weighted risk index is the worst-case scenario or not as follows:
S^j :=
p
T
1
T
sup
z;
h
Jj(z;  ; F^ )  Jj(z;; F^ )
i
;
and a test based on the decision rule:
reject Hj0 if S^j > cj ;
where cj is some (appropriate) critical value. In order to make the results more operational, we need to nd
an appropriate critical value cj. Since the distribution of the test statistic depends on the underlying distri-
bution, we rely on a block bootstrap method to simulate p-values (see Section 3 of Scaillet and Topaloglou,
2010 for the details). As the test statistic allows for full diversication of weights at all possible risk levels, we
require a mathematical maximization method. We use a mixed integer program to obtain the test statistic
for the rst-order SD dominance, which maximizes the distance between the sum over all scenarios of two
binary variables which represent G(z;  ; F^ ) and G(z;; F^ ), respectively (the empirical cdf of risk indices
with equal weights,  , and an alternative weighting scheme, , at a given risk level z), where binary values
take a value of one when z   0Y and z  0Y respectively, and zero otherwise. This formulation allows
us to test the dominance of the risk index with equally-weighted index ( ) over any other potential risk
index with an alternative weighting scheme . If the rst-order SDE does not hold, then the second-order
dominance e¢ ciency can be tested.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The data period in this analysis is 1 January 2006 until 31 December 2012. The sample contains quarterly
data (between 2006 Q1 and 2012 Q4) and for the following Eurozone countries: Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Belgium, Greece, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands, Austria, Finland. Smaller countries within the
EMU are not considered here, because of homogeneity of size or economic relevance.
To construct the index we employ the following macroeconomic variables: public debt/GDP - the higher
public debt/GDP, the higher the risk of the country -; budget balance/GDP - the higher the positive value of
the budget balance, the lower the risk of the country-; current account balance/GDP - the higher the positive
value of the current account balance, the lower the risk of the country-; net international investment position
(NIIP hereafter) as a percentage of GDP - the higher the net investment position, the lower the risk of the
country-; unemployment rate - the higher the unemployment rate, the higher the risk of the country. Brief
data descriptions are presented in Table 1, where all data set is obtained from Eurostat. The descriptive
statistics of all variables for the whole period and countries are in Table 2A.
Since all variables are measured in di¤erent units, we normalize each variable by linear rescaling technique
to unit range, so that the normalized outcome of each variable is in the 0-1 range. Then the normalized
values of each variable are kept the same if that variables higher values represent higher sovereign risk. If a
variable a¤ects a countrys sovereign risk negatively, then we convert the normalized values of that variable,
X, into 1-X. Table 2B o¤ers the descriptive statistics for normalized outcomes, where the higher normalized
values represent higher risk for all variables.
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The chosen variables focus both on external and internal balances. The trade channel has often been
associated with international spillovers. This channel may be particularly signicant inside the EMU - since
its foundation external trade and market integration are recognized as its cornerstones -, where intra-union
exchanges are extensive. The country-specic macroeconomic variables considered here (i.e., the public
debt/GDP ratio, the budget balance/GDP ratio, the current account balance as percentage of GDP and the
unemployment rate) are usually recognized to a¤ect the economic performance and the sovereigns ability to
service its debt. They allow us to uncover whether cross-country variation in risk exposure can be explained
by di¤erences in economic fundamentals at the country level. Moreover, we can evaluate whether sovereign
risk is a¤ected by an increased sensibility to macroeconomics fundamentals. Indeed, investors may reconsider
the importance of country-specic fundamentals which they previously overlooked (e.g., in Greece).
This set of variables allows us to sub-group them and disentangle the scal and the external trade e¤ects
for the Eurozone sovereign risk: we separate scal variables (public debt/GDP, budget balance/GDP)
and external tradevariables (current account/GDP, NIIP/GDP). The results of the empirical analysis are
given in the next section.
4 Results
This section summarizes our ndings of the test for SD1 e¢ ciency of the overall risk index and of indices
obtained considering sub-groups of variables. This sub-grouping is done both for robustness check and also
to construct indices specic to scal and external trade risk e¤ects within the Eurozone. The main ndings
are the following: the arbitrarily weighted risk indices are not e¤ective to capture the worst-case scenario
for sovereign risk; moreover, net international investment position/GDP and public debt/GDP are the main
contributors to country risk; while there is a positive correlation between the rankings of the most vulnerable
countries and the S&Ps ratings, there is weaker correlation for the other countries.
Table 3 summarizes the results for the overall macroeconomic risk index. The main contributor to
the overall (macroeconomic risk) index is net international investment position/GDP with 70.7% weight,
followed by public debt/GDP (16.83%), current account/GDP (8.4%), budget balance/GDP (3.76%) and
unemployment rate (0.31%). Tables 4 and 5 show the results with di¤erent grouping of variables. Consistent
with the overall macroeconomic risk ndings, we nd that public debt/GDP contributes the most for the
scal risk index with a weight around 89%, where the budget balance/GDP contributes with a weight around
11% (Table 4). Similarly, for the external trade e¤ects index, net international investment position/GDP
contributes the most with a weight around 86%, and the current account/GDP contribution is around 14%
(Table 5). We also show the rankings of the countries, which are computed for the rst, second, third and
fourth quarters of 2012 for each respective index. Tables 6A, 6B, and 6C represent the Eurozone country risk
rankings for overall, scal, and external trade risks. Fig. 1 shows the over-time evolution of the overall risk
index since 2006, while Figures 2 and 3 the over-time evolution of the two sub-indices (scal and external
trade risk indices respectively).
From the analysis of the overall index, we can distinguish a rst cluster consisting of the countries of the
European periphery, i.e., Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, and Italy, that experienced serious or moderate
nancial distress recently and whose governments had to implement severe policy measures. Among these
countries, Greece registers the highest value of the risk outcome. We recall that the Greek sovereign debt crisis
is commonly described as beginning in November 2009, when the new government of George Papandreou
revised the 2009 Greek decit from a previously estimated 5% to an alarming 12.7% of GDP. Besides, also
the alternative starting date April 2010 is often considered, when S&Ps slashed Greeces sovereign debt
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rating to junk status. Figures 1, 2 and 3 describe the over-time worsening of risk for Greece, anticipating the
downgrading that the rating agencies performed much later in time. A second cluster of countries consists of
France, Austria and Finland, which all represented strong credits through the global crisis. A third cluster
shows a similar pattern for the lowest risk countries, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium. In
particular, for these countries default risk barely changed during the crisis and, as remarked in Ang and
Longsta¤ (2013), most of the risk was apparently due to changes in systemic risk.
This subdivision in clusters is very similar to Ang and Longsta¤ (2013) - with the exception of France -,
although they used a completely di¤erent approach. France is ranked a little higher in our riskiness scale,
also when we compare our rankings with the S&Ps ratings in 2012.4 Our index for France anticipates the
downgrading that the big three credit raters performed much later in time (S&Ps and Moodys downgraded
Frances rating at the very end of 2012 and Fitch in July 2013), because of a heavier government debt load
and poor prospects for growth. Thus, our index seems to act as an early warning index.
Finally, while there is a positive correlation between our rankings of the most vulnerable countries and
the S&Ps ratings (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain, Italy), the correlation for other countries is weaker (e.g.,
Belgium). It is well known that rating agencies, such as S&Ps, generally produce stable ratings even in the
outbreak of a global economic and nancial crisis and their ratings remained unchanged after excessively
high or low spreads, in many cases; moreover, the three main agencies are more reluctant to upgrade when
spreads are excessively low than downgrade when spreads are excessively high, showing an asymmetric trend.
Our remarks above about the delay in the rating changes seem to conrm this view.
4.1 Conclusion
In this paper we propose a new method to assess sovereign risk index in Eurozone countries using an approach
that relies on consistent tests for SD e¢ ciency. The test statistics and the estimators are computed using
mixed integer programming methods. We construct an overall index and indices specic to scal and external
trade e¤ects. We nd that the arbitrarily weighted risk indices are not optimal and that net international
investment position/GDP and public debt/GDP are the main contributors to country risk. The ranking
of countries is performed together with an analysis of the over-time evolution of the overall index and two
sub-indices (scal and external trade).
An extension of the current analysis is to employ forecasting models to obtain future projections of the
macroeconomic variables for each Eurozone country. In a recent paper, Pinar et al. (2012) employ SD
methodology to obtain the optimal forecast combination of forecasting models, an approach that could be
applied to obtain forecasts of macroeconomic variables. Hence, using these forecasts and the weights obtained
in this paper, one could estimate future risk levels of Eurozone countries. As such, our model could employ
SD e¢ ciency tests to analyze shorter span data to rene the forecast of future sovereign crises. Furthermore,
one could periodically apply SDE methodology to the same group of Eurozone countries with the same set
of variables to analyze whether there has been any change in the contribution of these variables to sovereign
risk. Finally, our methodology could be fruitfully applied to other group of countries, and in particular to
the other Euro countries that have been omitted in this analysis.
4The S&Ps ratings in 2012 are as follows: Greece SD; Portugal BB= negative; Italy BBB+= negative; Ireland
BBB+= negative; Spain A= negative; Belgium AA= negative; France AA+= negative; Austria AA+= negative; Finland
AAA=negative; The Netherlands AAA=negative; Germany AAA=stable.
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Table 1  
Data Descriptions and Sources. 
Macroeconomic fundamentals Definitions 
Public debt/GDP  The indicator is defined (in the Maastricht Treaty) as consolidated general 
government gross debt at nominal value, outstanding at the end of the period.  
Public budget balance/GDP  Public deficit/surplus (negative and positive values respectively) is defined in 
the Maastricht Treaty as general government net borrowing/lending 
according to the European System of Accounts (ESA95).  
Current Account Balance/GDP The current account balance (CAB) is the net lending/net borrowing of an 
economy. It covers all transactions (other than those in financial items) that 
involve economic values and occur between resident and non-resident units. 
Net international investment 
position (NIIP) /GDP 
Net international investment position (IIP) statistics record the financial 
assets and liabilities position of a country vis-à-vis the rest of the world.  
Unemployment rate 
 
The unemployment rate is the number of unemployed persons as a percentage 
of the labour force based on International Labour Office (ILO) definition. 
 
Table 2A  
Data and descriptive statistics (before normalization). 
 Unemployment rate Current Account  Budget Balance Public debt  NIIP  
Mean 8.935 -0.889 -4.225 77.424 -26.024 
Median 7.900 -0.900 -3.230 71.600 -17.600 
Std. Dev. 4.781 6.659 6.513 30.271 51.943 
Minimum 3.000 -19.900 -42.010 24.500 -116.700 
Maximum 26.100 11.900 11.740 170.300 67.600 
Table 2B  
Data and descriptive statistics (normalized to unit range). 
 Unemployment rate Current Account  Budget Balance Public debt  NIIP  
Mean 0.257 0.402 0.297 0.363 0.508 
Median 0.212 0.403 0.279 0.323 0.462 
Std. Dev. 0.207 0.209 0.121 0.208 0.282 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
Table 3 
Stochastic efficient weighting for macroeconomic fundamentals. 
Number of 
observations 
Number of dominating 
weighting scheme 
Unemp. 
rate 
CA 
Balance 
Budget 
Balance 
Public debt NIIP 
 
  Average of dominating weighting schemes 
308 308 0.0031 0.0840 0.0376 0.1683 0.7070 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5  
Stochastic efficient weighting for external trade variables. 
Number of 
observations 
Number of dominating 
weighting scheme 
CA Balance NIIP 
 
  Average of dominating weighting schemes 
308 276 0.1357 0.8643 
 
 
 
Table 4  
Stochastic efficient weighting for fiscal variables. 
Number of 
observations 
Number of dominating 
weighting  scheme 
Budget Balance Public debt 
  Average of dominating weighting schemes 
308 245 0.1144 0.8856 
Table 6A  
Rankings of Eurozone countries with respect to macroeconomic risk. 
Country  2012 Q1 Country 2012 Q2 Country 2012 Q3 Country 2012 Q4 
Greece 0.8445 Greece 0.8550 Greece 0.8562 Greece 0.9111 
Portugal 0.8273 Portugal 0.8424 Portugal 0.8371 Portugal 0.8714 
Ireland 0.7910 Ireland 0.7409 Ireland 0.7607 Ireland 0.8057 
Spain 0.7183 Spain 0.7130 Spain 0.7087 Spain 0.7291 
Italy 0.5176 Italy 0.5016 Italy 0.5051 Italy 0.5122 
France 0.4591 France 0.4651 France 0.4625 France 0.4628 
Austria 0.3477 Austria 0.3578 Austria 0.3493 Austria 0.3467 
Finland 0.3044 Finland 0.2969 Finland 0.2859 Finland 0.2945 
Germany 0.2126 Germany 0.2062 Germany 0.1993 Germany 0.1897 
Netherlands 0.1523 Netherlands 0.1519 Belgium 0.1493 Belgium 0.1441 
Belgium 0.1514 Belgium 0.1308 Netherlands 0.1297 Netherlands 0.1185 
 
 
Table 6B  
Rankings of Eurozone countries with respect to fiscal risk. 
Country  2012 Q1 Country 2012 Q2 Country 2012 Q3 Country 2012 Q4 
Greece 0.7234 Greece 0.8011 Greece 0.8330 Greece 0.8423 
Italy 0.6423 Italy 0.6450 Italy 0.6515 Italy 0.6507 
Portugal 0.5751 Portugal 0.6090 Portugal 0.6163 Portugal 0.6432 
Ireland 0.5515 Ireland 0.5603 Ireland 0.6059 Ireland 0.5951 
Belgium 0.5113 Belgium 0.4968 Belgium 0.5131 Belgium 0.4848 
France 0.4330 France 0.4365 France 0.4337 France 0.4278 
Germany 0.3698 Germany 0.3736 Germany 0.3733 Spain 0.4233 
Austria 0.3347 Spain 0.3628 Spain 0.3632 Germany 0.3746 
Spain 0.3318 Austria 0.3381 Austria 0.3280 Austria 0.3185 
Netherlands 0.2847 Netherlands 0.3046 Netherlands 0.3133 Netherlands 0.3129 
Finland 0.1731 Finland 0.1875 Finland 0.1937 Finland 0.2215 
 
 
Table 6C  
Rankings of Eurozone countries with respect to external trade risk. 
Country  2012 Q1 Country 2012 Q2 Country 2012 Q3 Country 2012 Q4 
Portugal 0.8856 Portugal 0.8946 Portugal 0.8827 Greece 0.9252 
Greece 0.8773 Greece 0.8647 Greece 0.8458 Portugal 0.9202 
Ireland 0.8432 Spain 0.7889 Ireland 0.7846 Ireland 0.8445 
Spain 0.8092 Ireland 0.7715 Spain 0.7830 Spain 0.7896 
Italy 0.4919 France 0.4763 Italy 0.4724 Italy 0.4803 
France 0.4668 Italy 0.4699 France 0.4713 France 0.4744 
Austria 0.3492 Austria 0.3655 Austria 0.3570 Austria 0.3556 
Finland 0.3425 Finland 0.3316 Finland 0.3104 Finland 0.3135 
Germany 0.1743 Germany 0.1670 Germany 0.1577 Germany 0.1442 
Netherlands 0.1152 Netherlands 0.1113 Netherlands 0.0818 Belgium 0.0735 
Belgium 0.0736 Belgium 0.0489 Belgium 0.0719 Netherlands 0.0680 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Evolution of the macroeconomic risk over time 
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Fig. 2. Evolution of the fiscal risk over time 
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Fig. 3. Evolution of the external trade risk over time 
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